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Abstract—Today’s harsh market conditions prompt companies 
to allocate the highest level of emphasis on corporate 
performance. However, in some cases interests of management 
and shareholders may clash. Subsequently providing investors 
with timely, accurate and valid information in today’s ever 
changing economic environment is vital for transparency.  Aim of 
this paper is to measure the association between corporate 
governance and corporate performance within companies in the 
energy sector listed at Borsa Istanbul (formerly known as 
Istanbul Stock Exchange). 
 
 




ncreased competitiveness and systemic risks have made it 
difficult for firms to survive in the recently globalized world 
economy and the age of continuous development and 
innovation, in other worlds corporate performance has become 
more pronounced than ever. While Ettlingerand Patton 
[1]argue for an industrial development versus firm based 
development, they state that financial development influences 
corruption problems. Beck et al., [2] state that firm size and 
value are crucial in decreasing corruption by financial 
development. In addition to this, Maskell [3] argues that 
business cycles and geographical conditions have an impact 
on firm performance. On the other hand Beugelsdijk [4] 
indicates firm-specific factors also have an effect on corporate 
performance on the innovation front. On a microeconomic 
level, corporate performance depends on many variables and 
one of these variables is ownership structure [5,6].  Keeping 
this in mind, we find especially principal/agent theory explains 
why some firms achieve better performance than others.  
Principal/agent problem is the result of asymmetric 
information between shareholders and management and is 
strongly connected to ethical values of top management and 
internal audit quality in a firm. Meanwhile, corporate 
governance aims to strengthen corporations’ operational and  
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cultural infrastructure and the attitude of management towards 
a more transparent culture and decision-making processes. 
Emergence of corporate governance has become inevitable 
in the light of recent scandals and volatile market conditions.  
Companies that have emphasized on transparent internal 
dynamics survived.  Many different bodies define corporate 
governance, but OECD has published a set of rules that has 
become more generally accepted. Capital Markets Board of 
Turkey (CMB) has come up with its own set of corporate 
governance principles, which are again based on the OECD’s 
corporate governance principles. 
Eliminating the existing conflicts between managements 
and shareholders is the focal point of corporate governance.  
Since corporate governance is said to improve the body of 
corporate culture, internal controls and internal audit, it is 
possible to expect an association between corporate income 
and assets as a result of good compliance. The four pillars of 
corporate governance: transparency, ethics, morality and 
sustainability. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Objectives of management in some situations differ from 
those of the company’s shareholders [7]. In the light of the 
recent scandals, it was clear that agents or managers in firms 
do not always act in favor of shareholders and focus on 
personal gains. Managers may choose to look toward short-
term goals, manipulate accounting methods to increase profits 
artificially [8,9].  Such behavior feeds the ground to enhance 
ever-growing principal/agent problem. Curing this epidemic is 
a challenging task for businesses since it is relatively easy to 
get lured into the notion of individual-wealth maximization, 
which may simply take over the interest of the firm.  
Corporate governance, as an ideology mainly focuses on the 
duties and responsibilities of board of directors in managing 
the company and their relationships with the shareholders of 
the company and other stakeholder groups [10]. Though there 
is not one single precise definition is accepted on a worldwide 
scope, the set of rules published by OECD is regarded as 
valid. The most important part of these rules is transparency, 
which is public announcement of important information that 
can affect the stock price of the incorporation, thus affect 
shareholders’ interests in turn. These announcements include 
news on financial information of the company, operations and 
management. Investors have the right to know what is going 
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 on in the company and compliance with corporate governance 
principles guarantees this [11].  In addition, any other 
significant information that is expected to affect the stock 
price should be announced to public timely; as to shareholders 
and investors have the same information at the same time and 
there is equality among shareholders, so that any abusive 
action in the Stock Market is prevented [8].  In this sense, 
corporate governance as an ideology incorporates 
transparency with all levels of decision-making processes 
within the firm. Corporate values, which can be defined as the 
ideology of the firm, are a set of highly important ingredients 
within the framework of corporate governance implementation 
[12].Undoubtedly, such an ideology, which aims to provide 
security for the shareholders, cannot function without business 
ethics. According to Vinten [13], business ethics is such a 
crucial ingredient of corporate governance that a consideration 
should be given to appointing a chief ethics officer or an 
ombudsman. 
Sustainability, continuous cash flow, and strong profits are 
some of the focal objectives of every business.   Each of these 
ingredients does contribute to the granter objective of 
maximizing the wealth of the shareholders as well. Lack of 
corporate governance increases the chance of failure; 
especially for family businesses since lack of transparency 
will create undefined job descriptions to encourage each 
family member to get involved in the business more. Given 
the high percentage of family businesses in the Turkish 
economy (95 per cent), successful implementation of 
corporate governance is one of the few chances to have these 
businesses avoid failure. Yu [14] argues that better-governed 
companies are associated with less risk from management and 
have value improvement potentials. Parkeret al., [15] state that 
relative to distressed firms, corporate governance attributes 
influence the likelihood of survival. Survival in the harsh 
market conditions requires awareness of not only internal 
dynamics but external factors as well.  Corporate governance 
involves a strategic plan that interconnects social issues in 
management with financial performance. Through keen 
understanding of the business’ activities at the business and 
society interface, businesses can use corporate governance as a 
tool to enhance corporate performance [16]. According to 
Downes and Gail [17], the demise of Enron was due in large 
part to a lack of ethics rather than a lack of regulations. 
In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 
2002 regulates corporate governance, and firms listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ must now 
answer to their respective standards, which were approved by 
the Security and Exchange Commission in 2003.In Turkey, 
Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) has also adopted the 
rules presented by OECD, which is mandatory for publicly 
held companies. CMB expects compliance with these rules 
and a periodical report to be announced to public on the 
Internet. Until recently, CMB has made a number of 
improvements in these principles, such as announcing the 
salary and bonus packages of top management and including 
an independent contributor to Board of Directors. With these 
improvements, it is possible to say that publicly held 
companies are expected to take corporate governance more 
seriously than family businesses. 
Corporate governance is not only a tool that provides better 
risk management, but also helps with decision-making process 
by securing future cash flow. Varış et al., [18] state that stable 
and long lasting international capital flow grandly depends on 
corporate governance principles. Yu [14] argues that analysts 
are concerned about the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms enforced by the company when they evaluate the 
company’s investment potentials. That is why family 
businesses are doomed as long as they ignore corporate 
governance. The ideas presented here simply show that 
corporate performance is linked to application of corporate 
governance principles; especially profit margin and ROA are 
positively affected by corporate performance. ROE and ROA 
are quite important because they are the ratios that point out 
the performance of top management and whether they have 
been acting for the purposes of shareholders’ interests. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that website announcements 
concerning corporate governance have an association with 
corporate performance [19].  
Corporate governance can only be established by the 
involvement of top management through periodic board and 
audit committee meetings. Studies have shown a significantly 
positive (negative) relationship between earnings management 
and the disclosure of the presence of financial experts on audit 
committees after the passage of SOX [20]. Audit committee 
not only has senior level managers but independent 
contributors such as independent auditors. Audit reports are 
discussed here and decisions on corrective actions are made. 
This is the spinal cord of corporate governance because 
without proper and regular meetings of the audit committee, it 
is not possible to integrate corporate governance with the 
overall company culture as an ideology [21, 22]. Moreover, 
financial experts on fully independent audit committees 
improve the credibility of earnings information and mitigate 
earnings management after SOX [20]. 
CMB advises the usage of company websites for important 
announcements, thus all parties that are involved with the firm 
can access important news that can affect the stock price. 
Furthermore, it is possible to say that corporate governance is 
a key point in ensuring ideal stock market conditions. 
This is strongly related to morality and ethics as a problem. 
In a suitable environment this kind of ideas may result in fraud 
as mentioned above. Corporate governance involves the 
securing of shareholders’ interests by imposing rules on ethics 
and transparency in order to prevent such unwanted scenarios 
in management level. Fraud schemes also affect the 
sustainability of the firm; because once shareholders’ and 




Companies operating in energy sector listed at Borsa 
Istanbul were chosen. They are 18 companies in total and are 
given in Appendix 1. 
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 B. Research Design 
This research is descriptive and Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
non-parametric measurement method was employed. 
C. Measurement Instruments 
Announcement of Corporate Governance Principles 
Compliance Report and financial statements on the websites 
of the selected companies are taken into consideration. In 
relation to this, corporate governance is evaluated by a dummy 
variable. 
The following ratios for evaluating corporate performance 
for the year 2012 have been calculated: Profit margin, ROA, 
ROE, Basic Earning Power (BEP), EPS and price earnings 
ratio, operating cash flow/average accounts receivable, non-
operating cash flow/net income, operational profit/total cash 
flow ratios. Secondary data were gathered from independent 
audit reports of the companies. All variables are ratio scaled. 
 
IV. FINDINGS 
Announcement of Corporate Governance Principles 
Compliance Report and financial statements on the websites 
of the selected companies are taken into consideration. In 
relation to this, corporate governance is evaluated by a dummy 
variable. 
The following ratios for evaluating corporate performance 
for the year 2012 have been calculated: Profit margin, ROA, 
ROE, Basic Earning Power (BEP), EPS and price earnings 
ratio, operating cash flow/average accounts receivable, non-
operating cash flow/net income, operational profit/total cash 
flow ratios. Secondary data were gathered from independent 
audit reports of the companies. All variables are ratio scaled. 
Results of Wilcoxon signed ranks test for 90% confidence 
level are presented in the table below. 
 
Table 1. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Results 
 
Independent Variable Significance 





Price Earnings Ratio ,093 
Opr. cash flow/Avg. a/r ,000 
Non-opr. cash flow/Net Income ,542 
Operational profit/Total cash flow ,845 
 
According to the analysis it is observed that the corporate 
governance influences financial performance. This is because 
of significant results in profit margin, ROA, ROE and BEP. 
Profit margin is significant by 0,053; ROA is significant by 
0,001; ROE is significant by 0,001, likewise BEP is 
significant by 0,001; thus null hypotheses are rejected for 
these variables. However, EPS is found to be insignificant by 
0,170 and Price Earnings Ratio is found to be insignificant by 
0,093. Since Borsa Istanbul is better explained by technical 
analysis instead, EPS and price earnings ratios are not 
significant according to analysis results. 
ROA and ROE show the success of management in 
generating profits. Accordingly, organizations that are better 
compliant with corporate governance principles are more 
profitable as expected. Additionally, profit margin and BEP 
also concur with the fact that corporate governance as an 
ideology creates a control environment that increases 
efficiency and effectiveness of the firm. Nonetheless, when we 
focus on the profitability ratios, it is clear that companies, 
which are noncompliant with corporate governance principles, 
choose to generate profit by financial market investments 
instead of operations.  
BEP as the ratio of EBIT over total assets indicates a high 
tax amount for the sector, which explains the decline in net 
profit figures and a rising tendency for investing in financial 
markets.  
Wilcoxon signed rank test results show that operating cash 
flow is an important indicator of corporate governance 
because a company that is compliant with corporate 
governance principles and ethics can and should choose its 
business partners more carefully and according to a risk based 
assessment. As a result, operating cash flow/average accounts 
receivable indicates that companies that are noncompliant with 
corporate governance refrain from working with trusted 
business partners and have higher cost of capital. 
In this study non-operating cash flow is considered as 
income from transactions made in financial markets. Majority 
of the selected companies have used financial markets to 
produce extra cash flow to retain in the business, which 
happens to be an indicator of success in cash management and 
not related to operating income. Since total cash flow also 
includes non-operating cash flow items, non-operating cash 
flow/net income, operational profit/total cash flow are 
insignificant to corporate governance principles. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance principles show that a transparent 
environment for companies to act upon is felt in every 
function of the organization with the right attitude from the 
management. Especially a well-functioning internal audit 
department is the key point in securing company culture that 
embraces corporate governance. Although internal audit is 
very important for corporate governance, attitude of 
management cannot be denied at this stage. Without any 
endorsement from management, it is not likely to incorporate 
a corporate governance ideology. 
Accordingly, organizations are expected to assign 
significant importance to internal audit function for 
compliance with corporate governance principles. In addition 
to this, top management and board of directors are anticipated 
to make it clear that they are supporting legitimacy and 
corporate governance. The most important tool in ensuring 
compliance with corporate governance principles is public 
announcement of important information.  
The association between corporate governance and 
corporate performance measured by ROA, ROE, profit 
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 margin, basic earning power, and operating cash flow/average 
accounts receivable, has been investigated specifically on 
companies only of the energy sector at Borsa Istanbul. 
Analysis results show that there is an association between 
companies that are compliant with corporate governance 
principles and corporate financial performance. In other 
words, top management that is respectful to transparency and 
ethics can and do generate income better, get to choose 
business partners accordingly and increase profitability of 
assets and equity as well. 
Also, in this study, we showed that companies that properly 
announce and disclose important information such as financial 
tables, audit reports, corporate governance compliance reports 
to public on a periodical basis are considered as better 
compliant with these principles. Naturally, companies with 
steady profits and solid asset maintenance are necessary to 
continue practicing these principles. For future, we 
recommend investigation of liquidity ratios combined with 
corporate performance. 
APPENDIX 1 
Companies Included in the Analysis 
AkEnerji, AksaEnerji, AksuEnerji, AnelElektrik, Atlantik 
Petrol, Avrasya Petrol, AyenEnerji, Aygaz, EmekElektrik, 
GersanElektrik, IşıklarElektrik, İpekEnerji,,Mepet Metro 




















Skewness Kurtosis  
Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Std.Error 
CorporateGovernance 18 ,00 1,00 ,7778 ,42779 -1,461 ,536 ,137 1,038
Profit Margin 18 -1,48 3,03 ,3506 ,99733 1,565 ,536 3,679 1,038
ROA 18 -,03 ,23 ,0567 ,08105 ,963 ,536 -,019 1,038
ROE 18 -,06 ,85 ,1299 ,21159 2,489 ,536 7,859 1,038
BEP 18 -,03 ,25 ,0547 ,07744 1,632 ,536 2,099 1,038
EPS 18 -,14 210,00 12,1952 49,38489 4,237 ,536 17,966 1,038




17 2,55 45,50 12,2982 10,17642 2,288 ,550 6,950 1,063
Non operating cash 
flow/Net Income 18 -18,20 8,75 ,1378 5,14719 -2,605 ,536 10,649 1,038
Operational profit/Total 
cash flow 18 -2,44 8,49 1,4056 2,80803 1,635 ,536 2,274 1,038
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